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IN THE ,SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAUDE COX PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, RESPONDENT'S 
vs. BRIEF 
JOSEPH NIELSON, No. 8605 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT, 
JOSEPH NIELSON 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Defendant's Exhibit 2 is a map of U. S. Highvvay 
89 at and near its intersection with the Shu1nvv.ay Road. 
It is on a scale of two inches to one hundred feet. Exhibit 
3 is a map of the sarr1e intersection. It is on a scale of 
1/Sth inch to the foot. On Exhibits 2 and 3 are the 
measured distances between material physical objects. 
The measurements were made by the witness, A. Dale 
Bartholomew. He made said 1naps and placed the meas-
urements thereon. Said n1aps also show the location 
of rose bushes, other natural objects, and Inarkings. 
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2 
Some of those 'vere given by other witnesses. Shown 
on said maps in the middle of Highway 89 is a two 
laned, hard surfaced, 18 foot wide good grade asphalt 
strip. 
Four white posts numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, were on 
the West shoulder of Highway 89. They are shown on 
defendant's Exhibit 2. Number one is at the Shumway 
Intersection, number two 500 feet north thereof, number 
three 950 feet north thereof, and number four 1018 feet 
north thereof. 
The location of a culvert, ditches, stop sign, and 
gouge.s made by an automobile tire in the ditch bank 
and on the shoulder, as well as location of the glass, 
etc. from the wreck, are given on Exhibit 3. 
A few feet west of said culvert, the road drops off 
about the heighth of a n1an - 5 feet 10 inches. This 
drop or lowness of the Shumway Road west of the cul-
vert deters visibility of things coming from the north 
(Tr. 174-5, 275-6). Highway 89 at or near white posts 3 
and 4 rises a little or drops towards the northward more 
rapidly from 1,000 feet north of the intersection of High-
way 89 and the Shumway Road (Tr. 176, 197-8, 209, 
273-4). 
These t'vo white posts numbered 3 and 4, other ob-
jects, and the low place in the Shun1,vay Road west of 
the culvert, prevents a clear vision of a car coming 
towards the south fro1n Ephrailn, for son1e distance 
north of .~.aid posts 3 and 4 (Tr. 272-5). 
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Defendant's Exhibit G is the publication of the Utah 
Highway Patrol which gives the feet travelled per second 
at various speeds, the approximate co-efficient of fric-
tion, stopping distances after depressing brake, and 
stopping distances of good brakes on good pavement. 
The introduction of said exhibit w.as first resisted, but 
later upon renewal of offer \Vas received 'vithout ob-
jection ( Tr. 315-16). 
Just before the collision, defendant drove his truck 
east\vard on the Shumway Road and into IIighway 89. 
When he got to said highway, he looked north as far 
as the two white posts (nos. 3 and 4) approxi1n.ately 1000 
feet from the Shumway Road and saw no car on the 
road in that distance. He looked south and saw a car 
coming from the south. It was about 600 feet away (Hol-
brook car). He waited for that car to pass, and then 
proceeded to drive forward (Tr. 285-6). 
Defendant's t:ruek entered the junction or inter-
section of Highway 89 and the Shumway Road first. It 
entered Highway 89 from plaintiff's right. Defendant 
drove it "right up to the hard surface portion of said 
high,vay according to the plaintiff (Tr. 24). The court 
found defendant stopped his truck approximately 6 to 
10 feet west of the asphalt strip (R. 35). 
He stopped when the Holbrook car was within 150 
to 200 feet of defendant's truck (Tr. 10-11). He yielded 
the right-of-way to said car. He then drove forward. 
By the time his car moved forward fro1n bet~·een six 
to thirteen feet, the plaintiff's c.ar struck it witn great 
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-' 
force. Heavy black tire marks of the plaintiff's car 
showed on the asphalt strip 41 to 45 feet before the 
impact, and 57 to 64 feet after the impact. By said 
impact, defendant's truck was knocked entirely around 
and south .along the highway for a distance of 30 to 50 
feet (R. 35-7, Ex. 3). Defendant's truck was completely 
demoli.shed. Plaintiff's car was seriously and substan-
tially damaged (estimate $1606.70). She was slightly 
injured. Defendant sustained permanent and serious in-
juries (R. 35-7, Ex. 3). 
The deposition of Yvonne Holbrook was introduced 
by plaintiff. :Nirs. Holbrook testified the speed of her car 
as it approached and passed the Shumway Inter.sec-
tion was 50 to 55 miles per hour; and the court so found 
(R. 35). Mrs. Holbrook testified that she observed de-
fendant's truck coming East on the Shumway Road; 
that she saw the fellow in the car lean forward .as if 
to look if there were any cars; and at that time the 
truck came to a stop when her car 'Yas 150 to 200 feet 
South of defendant (Tr. 10-12). 
Plaintiff testified that when she first saw defend-
ant's car it was coining up the Shumway Road at what 
she figured was a pretty good rate of speed for that 
kind of a road; that she sa"' defendant's truck come up to 
the highway and co1ne to a co1nplete stop ( Tr. 23-24). 
On cross-exan1ination plaintiff testified she was 
right along- or approxi1nately by the posts designated 
as "3" and "4" on defendant's Exhibit 2 "Then she first 
applied hl\r brakes ( approxin1ately 1000 feet North of 
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defendant's truck); that then she applied her brake and 
continued to slow down until she took her foot off the 
brake and accelerated again at approximately post "2" 
( 500 feet north of defendant's truck) ( Tr. 62-3). She 
accelerated without sounding her horn or seeing whether 
or not defendant was looking one way or the other (R. 
37). 
The time at which she began said acceleration was 
when defendant stopped his truck. At that tin1e, the I-Iol-
brook c.ar was coming towards plaintiff and defendant 
from the south at 50 to 55 miles per hour (Tr. 12, 62). 
It was followed by a heavily loaded truck some 750 feet 
behind (R. 36). 
Plaintiff applied her brakes innnediately when de-
fendant began to move forward (Tr. 27). The usual 
reaction time \vould put her car at 75 feet to 110 feet 
back of the tire skid marks, or when she observed danger 
she was 120 to 155 feet from defendant's truck, although 
she testified it was 50 to 75 feet (Tr. 27). 
Plaintiff does not challenge the finding of the court 
that the plaintiff's car passed the Holbrook car 75 to 
100 feet North of defendant's truck (R. 36). 
Defendant filed his motion for assess1nent of costs 
in the lower court (R. 43) and argued the same. 
ARGUMENT 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S POINTS I. AND II. THERE 
IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE 
SPEED OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CAR WAS IN EXCESS OF 
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60 MIL.ES PER HOUR 75 TO 100 FEET NORTH OF THE 
POINT O·F COLLISION; AND THAT SAID SPEED WAS 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF, OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
CAUSE OF HER DAMAGES. 
This case was tried by the court without a jury. 
It is a law case. There is conflict in the testimony of the 
plaintiff in itself as to the speed _she was traveling. 
What she said about her speed in reference to the 
physical objects and that which she g.ave in figures, are 
two different things. The testimony of a witness taken 
on deposition, and introduced by plaintiff, challenges 
plaintiff'_s testimony. The testimony of witnesses Hol-
brook, Bartholomew, defendant, Dr. Christensen, and 
Etta Johnson, established plaintiff's speed was in excess 
of 60 1niles an hour; and that said speed was the proxi-
mate cause of, or contributed to her dan1ages. 
The trial judge saw and heard all the witnesses 
and viewed the exhibits. He 'vas personally familiar with 
the junction of the road, or the intersection where the 
collision occurred. In respect to the testimony of Dr. 
H. Reed Christensen, he conducted and did much of the 
examination, or directed its course. 
A. Findings Are To Be Upheld. 
Plaintiff refers four tilnes to the case of Alrarado 
vs. Tucker, et al, 2 U. 2d 16, 260 P. 2d 986. The facts of 
that case are entirely different fron1 this case. T"~iee 
referring to it on the question of speed, plaintiff states 
the findings "" * * n1ust be based on the preponderance 
of the evidenee ( app. B. pp. 7, 15). 
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Appellant challenges the findings of fact herein. 
On .appeal the correct rule is not that the findings must 
be .supported by the preponderance as to speed, or any 
other fact: 
"Hence, if there is any competent evidence 
in the record to support the court's findings the 
judgment should not be disturbed." 
Buckley v. Cox, 122 U. 151; 247 I). 2d 277. 
This court also said: 
"As this is a lavv action, the que.stion is not 
whether the evidence would have supported the 
decision in favor of the appellants, but whether 
the decision made by the trial court finds support 
in the evidence. If there is competent credible 
evidence to support the findings made by the 
trial court, then those findings should stand." 
Jensen v. Gerrard et al, 85 U. 481 ; 39 P. 2d 
1070. 
In a case which was tried by the court, this court 
said: 
"Thi.s is a case at law. It therefore follows 
that this appeal is upon questions of law alone. 
That being true the function of this court is not 
to pass upon the weight of the evidence, nor to 
determine conflicts therein, but to examine it 
solely for the purposes of determining whether 
or not the judgment finds substantial support in 
the evidence. In so examining the evidence all 
rea.sonable presumptions are in favor of the trial 
court's findings and judgment, and the evidence 
must be considered in the light Inost favorable to 
them. If the findings and judgment are substan-
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tially supported by the evidence, then the court 
may not disturb them." 
Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co. et al, 106 U. 
289 at p. 294; 147 P. 2·d 875. 
B. Record To Be Viewed Favorab.ly To Respondent. 
How shall the record on appeal be read or considered 
by this court~ Our supreme court has said that the record 
on appeal must be read in a light most favorable to the 
respondent. Since the trier of the facts found in re-
spondent's favor, the evidence should so be viewed. 
Lowder vs. Halley, et al 120 U. 231; 233 P. 2d 360 .. 
Our court has stated the rule thus: 
"Thus we must view the evidence in its most 
favorable aspect to support the verdict which 
the jury has rendered and if from the evidence 
the jury could reasonably find facts necessary 
to sustain their verdict, it must be sustained. 
This is true, even though had ~e been the triers 
of the facts we 'vould have found them differently, 
or even though we may not believe that the jury 
did in f.act so find, or, even though we believe 
that such a finding would be against the great 
preponderance of the evidence." 
Horsley v. Robin son, et al., 112 lr. 227; 186 
P. 2d 592. 
C. Co1npetent Cred·itable Evidence Slzozrs Speed Over 
60 miles per hour; and such speed U'as the p'rox·imate 
cattse of plaintiff's dantages. 
It is then a sin1ple mathen1atical eon1putation to 
calculate the speed of plaintiff's ear 'vhich traveled 400 
to 425 feet \Yhile one traYeling 50 to 55 1uiles per hour 
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9 
traveled approximately 225 to 300 feet. It only had to 
travel lj10th to 1/5th farther than did the Holbrook 
car to have traveled in excess of 60 miles per hour. 
Using the 1nid figure between 225 and 300 feet or 262.5 
feet of travel for the llolbrook car, and 400 feet for the 
plaintiff's car, plaintiff's ear traveled 128.5 feet farther 
in the san1e tirne, or approxiinately half again .as fast; or 
it was traveling an average of approximately 74 miles 
per hour during the last 400 feet before the crash. 
There is another test of the evidence \vhich reaches 
the same result. The defendant testified that he looked 
north and could see as far north as the two white posts 
(Nos. 3 and 4, Ex. 2), \vhich vvas approximately 1000 
feet; that he then looked south and sa,,~ .a car approaching 
at about 600 feet; th.at he " 7aited for that one to pass and 
then he proceeded to drive forward (Tr. 286). vVhen 
the plaintiff testified that at approximately the two 
white posts "3" and "4" she saw Mr. Nielson (his truck) 
and applied her brake.s (Tr. 62), she in substance told 
the court that at approximately 1000 feet she s.a\v the 
defendant's truck entering the intersection. It is a reas-
onable deduction that was just after the defendant looked 
north and then looked south and saw a car approximately 
at 600 feet away. Then while the Holbrook car at 50 to 
55 miles per hour traveled between 675 to 700 feet, 
plaintiff's car traveled 900 to 925 feet. Again taking 
the aver .age figures of 687.5 feet and 912.5 feet, the 
plaintiff's car traveled 225 feet farther in the sa1ne time 
during the first half of which it was slowing down and 
the last half accelerating. Here we reach the result of 
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10 
approximately one-fourth faster than the Holbrook car 
-62.5 to 68 miles per hour. 
Is it strange that the computation of Dr. Christensen 
figured the speed of plaintiff's car to be approximately 
70-71 miles per hour (Tr. 250, 259). By three different 
tests from the evidence approximately the same speed 
of the plaintiff's car is reached. 
Plaintiff had a right to rely that no car would 
approach from the northward at any speed appreciably 
faster or a distance appreciably farther than the car 
coming from the south; and that if so approaching, plain-
tiff would still hav~e been four to five hundred feet north 
of defendant vvhen the car from the south passed, and 
when he began to move forward. At a speed of 60 miles 
or less, the plaintiff would have been able to stop her 
car within 251 feet at the time the danger appeared. 
In that event, she would have had between 150 and 250 
additional feet in which to stop, if she had been traveling 
'vithin the lawful rate of speed. 
This court has upheld a lovver courfs judgn1ent that 
the driver of a vehicle 'Yho looked 40 rods north,vest of 
the intersection ( 660 feet) and sa": no car "ithin that 
distance was not negligent in failing to look ag.ain where 
the way was clear that far; and "~here the other driver 
was approaching at an excessive rate of speed. 
"I-Iad Ruth Holley exercised such reasonable 
and ordinary care the collision "Tould not have 
occurred. Under such a state of facts Amas.a 
Lowder's failure to see the truck could have in 
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11 
no way contributed to the accident." 
Lowder v. Holley, et al, 120 U. 231; 233 P. 
2d 350. 
It was said by Justiee Wolfe in his concurring 
opinion in Poulsen vs. JJ:lanness, et al 121 U. 269 at p. 
275; 241 P. 2d 152: 
"The plaintiff need only appraise the situa-
tion with regard to what the lawful rate of speed 
is upon the intersecting road." 
The same rule was again announced by Justice 
Crockett in Mart in vs. Steve-ns, 121 U. 484 at p. 496; 
243 P. 2d 747: 
"He then looked to the east and saw no car 
within the extent of his vision, 150 to 200 feet. 
At that instant he was entitled to assume, absent 
anything to warn him to the contrary, that any 
car approaching from that direction would do 
.so at a lawful rate of speed * * *." 
Plaintiff claims that the testimony of Wallace Tatton 
corroborated plaintiff's testimony as to speed. Defendant 
denies this. Among other things said witness testified 
that the plaintiff passed hin1 "approxi1nately a half of 
a mile or a mile this side of Ephrai1n (south); that at 
the time of the collision he would say plaintiff was 
"about 8 blocks ahead of the witness." ~!anti's blocks are 
429 feet without streets. Whether it was blocks or what 
is was we couldn't tell from the testimony. But he 
' definitely testified that he could not tell at what speed 
plaintiff's car proceeded ahead of him (Tr. 82). 
Plaintiff claims it w.as the duty of the trial court 
to completely disregard the evidence of the vvitness, 
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12 
Etta Johnson. Said witness went back to the scene of 
the collision. She pointed out the distances on the high-
way and helped Mr. Jensen measure them (Tr. 206, 
210). There is no doubt her testimony was to the effect 
that the plaintiff's car was going a great deal faster 
than the Holbrook car, and she \Vanted her testimony 
to so show. 
Said witness also misjudged the distance from the 
witness stand to a di.stant house, which she 'vas asked 
to look at through the window. Judge Larsen also mis-
judged the distance. He judged it to be 250 feet (Tr. 
208). Both said it \vas hard to judge from the Court 
Room (light in the courtroom, and venetian blinds at 
the windows through which both looked, made it diffi-
cult). 
Dr. H. Reed Christensen testified: That he was 
graduated from the Brigham Young lTniversity with a 
major in Physics in 1926; that he received his master's 
degree in Physics in 1929 from the University of Chicago; 
that in 1940 he received his PhD. from Ohio State College 
in Philosophy and Physics; that he taught at Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology; that he did special 
work for the U. S. Government during the war in Physics 
fron11942 to 1946; that he presently 'Yas te.aching Physics 
at Snow Colllege and had been teaching Physics between 
28 and 30 years (Tr. 240-41, 243). 
He also testified that he 'vas familiar "~ith the junc-
tion of Highway 89 with the Shu1nway Road and the 
particular surface. He 1nade an experilnent as to the 
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13 
abrasive character of the road or the co-efficient of 
friction on that type of road, and got the approximate 
value of 80 per cent when he dragged a rubber automo-
bile tire thereon (Tr. 254, 257). This is what Exhibit 6 
shows for same type of road. 
Further he testified he considered the weight of 
the plaintiff's DeSoto and the 'veight of defendant's 
truck, with occupants (Tr. 250). 
He computed how much energy would be used up 
by the co-efficient of friction at eight-tenths; and took 
the distance which the plaintiff's car slid before the 
impact, and after the impact, and what energy was used 
by the truck as it skidded; added them, and put it into 
the standard formula that gives the kinetic energy, and 
he came out with 63 miles per hour which the plaintiff's 
car was traveling at the point where the brake or tire 
skid marks started to show. This did not include the 
energy used in stopping the wheels until the skid mark~ 
showed ( Tr. 249). 
Likewise he cornputed the energy used according 
to a generally accepted standard of loss of en~rgy where 
there isn't an elastic impact - such as where the cars 
stay together (using the actual weights of the cars with 
occupants). By that computation, the plaintiff's car would 
have been traveling 85 miles per hour. But when he used 
60 per cent of the energy conserved (consumed) when 
the truck wa.s struck and the cars were smashed up, 
he came out with a speed of plaintiff's car at 70 to 71 
miles per hour (Tr. 249-50, 259). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
He testified that he saw the plaintiff's car after the 
impact and before it was repaired; but he did not see 
the defendant's truck. 
His computations were made on the basis of 41 feet 
of skid 1narks of the plaintiff's car before the impact and 
56 feet .after impact (Tr. 252); and using the defendant's 
witnesses figures of 45 feet before instead of 41 feet, 
and 63 feet instead of 56, he judged the speed of plain-
tiff's car was greater than 73 miles per hour (Tr. 258). 
Much of the testimony given by Dr. Christensen 
was in answer to direct question.s by the court. Objections 
to Dr. Christensen's testimony was primarily on the 
grounds th.a t the questions did not include son1e of the 
facts which the appellant claims should be included. It 
has been written by some authorities that all the pertin-
ent facts to an ultimate issue need not be included 
upon questions to an expert 'vitness. (58 ..._.\_nl. J ur., Sec. 
854, p. 483). 
Our court has in the cases of J.llartirt Y. SteL·ens, 121 
lT. 484, 243 P. 2d 7±7; and in Al/carado rs. Tucker, et al, 
supra, approved the testi1nony of poliee officers as to 
the speed of an auto1nobile fron1 1neasured skid 1uarks 
together 'vith the use of charts sho,ving the relationship 
between the speed and stopping distanees. Other states 
'vhich have .similar situations ltaYe accepted the testi1nony 
of an expert on speed fron1 the length of skid 1narks, 
L1~nde et al v. E1Jun ick, 61 P. 2d 338 and cases cited 
therPin. A situation not unlike the one at bar "~as eon-
sidered b)T our court: 
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"Appellant's objection to the so-called expert 
testimony of Dr. Castleton is not well taken. The 
opinions expressed by him were largely from his 
own observations .and come more nearly being 
the answers of a skilled witness based upon what 
he observed than that of an expert based upon 
an assumed state of facts or facts in evidence 
adduced from other witnesses." 
Spackman v. Benefit As.sociation of Railway 
Employees, 97 U. 91 at p. 96; 89 P. 2d 
490. 
The record shows the defendants had an engineer 
(Tr. 254) and they were able to make their own compu-
tations and to confound Dr. Christensen, if they could 
so do. Failing to so do on either cross examination or 
rebuttal, the court was entitled to take the evidence .as 
reliable, substantial and competent. 
No reference was made at any time in this case, 
prior to the appellant's brief, to Andrew J. White's 
"Tire Dynamics, First Edition." It appears to be further 
refinement by experimentation of factors affecting tire 
marks on road surfaces in relation to the speed of the 
vehicle which laid them down. In a number of respects, 
it challenges accepted standards of this court as to the 
weight of the evidence of such marks. It is also hearsay. 
Since no opportunity was given the trial court or counsel 
to meet the same, defendant contends it should be disre-
garded a.s here say; is a publication which may not pro-
perly be judicially noticed; and which is not properly 
before the court. 
There has been much controversy about the effect of 
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Hickok vs. Ski1tner, 113 U. 1; 190 P. 2d 514. That contro-
versy appears to arise from the fact that one who saw 
a car at a distance of 400 to 500 feet \vas held to be 
contributorily negligent for a collision which followed 
when he proceeded through the intersection without 
again looking. In this case, the appellant .apparently 
contends that the plaintiff wa.s close enough to consti-
tute an immediate hazard within the meaning of our 
statute. A similar situation existed in said Hickok vs. 
Skinner. There the court said: 
"Plaintiff's evidence was that defendant was 
400 to 500 feet back from the intersection travel-
ling at a speed of 45 mph. If the distance was 400 
feet, the defendant would have required approxi-
mately six seconds to reach the point of collision; 
if 500 feet aw.ay, approximately seven and one-
half seconds. Under such facts defendant's car 
could not be said to have been approaching so 
closely as to constitute an inrmediate hazard." 
Hickok v. Skinner, supra. 
It is interesting to note that 'Yhere the defendant 
\Vas making a left hand turn across a through high,vay, 
and saw the plaintiff approaching in excess of 375 feet, 
that the plaintiff's excessive speed 'Yas held to be a 
contributing cause of the accident; and said case 'va~ 
disn1is.sed. Walker vs. Peterson., 3 U. 2d 5-!; 278 P. 2d 
291. 
We do not agree tl1at the other authorities cited by 
the appellant in his brief are in point. In each and all 
of them, they involve faets 1nateria.lly different fron1 
tho~e involYed in tht\ in~tant case. None of then1 involYe 
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facts where the plaintiff saw the defendant enter the 
intersection 1,000 feet aw.ay, saw him slow down and stop 
for a car which was within 150 to 200 feet, or an im-
mediate hazard; and then uphold plaintiff's attempt to 
bolt through the right of way which defendant had; and 
where he had pre-empted the intersection. We submit 
that is what plaintiff tried to do here; and that her speed 
proximately caused, or contributed to her damages. 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S POINTS III AND IV. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT 
THE SPEED o·F THE PLAINTIFF \VAS NOT REASONABLE 
OR PRUDENT UNDER THE EXISTING CONDITIONS; 
THAT SHE DID NOT KEEP A PROPER LOOK-OUT; AND 
WAS IN OTHER RESPECTS, NEGLIGENT, WHICH PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED, OR CO-NTRIBUTED TO HER DAMAGE. 
As part of this point defendant adopts the fore-
going argument. 
Was the fact that after defendant had entered said 
junction of the roads or intersection more than 40 feet, 
and was within three to six feet of the path of the plain-
tiff'.s car such a fact situation that a reasonable prudent 
person would again speed up in an effort to "barrel 
through" as the trial court put it, or whizz by the de-
fendant's truck at 52 to 55 miles per hour according to 
plaintiff's view, and bet~een 65 to 75 miles per hour 
according to defendant's view, the act of an ordinary, 
reasonable prudent person~ The mere statement of the 
facts to the trial court's mind, and to ours, answers itself 
that no ordinary reasonable prudent person would so 
do; and especially without a careful look and sounding 
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her horn. He had pre-e1npted the intersection. The facts 
gave her notice thereof. 
On top of those facts plaintiff admitted she did 
not see defendant driver looking toward the neare_st ap-
proaching car, and she did not sound her horn. She 
should have known he would not be expecting her, and 
that he might reasonably be expected to move forward 
as he did. In view of her fast arrival at the scene, she 
was wholly unexpected. Plaintiff kne\v defendant in-
tended to enter the path she would take (Tr. 61). He 
could well be expected to move for\vard on the passing 
of the nearest vehicle. In view of this situation, surely 
she owed the duty to slow down, have her car under 
control, and to honk to ensure safe operation of the other 
vehicle and her own, as provided by Section -±1-6-14 
U.C.A. '53. 
Persons \vho look to,vards an approaching car at 
a crossing or intersection, are not bound to figure cars 
are approaching at an unla\vful rate of speed; but need 
only regard those only .approaching \vithin a distance 
\vhich at a la,yful speed constitute an innnediate hazard. 
"Auto1nobile driver, entering High,vay from 
private drive\vay after looking in direction from 
\vhirh another auto approaehed at greater distanee 
than hi_s vision carried, had a right to presume 
that driver thereof would not exreed statutory 
speed liinit." 
Fontanille v. Ducote, 155 S. 46 (La. 1934). 
The ahoYt' ea8e held that "yhere a driver looked for 
.a distanee of 85 yards and sn"y no auto1nobile approach-
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ing, that the excessive speed of the automobile striking 
the rear end of the car rnaking the left turn into the 
highway was the sole proxin1ate cause of the accident. 
The above reasoning and holding was later approved. 
"As the defendant Taylor stopped .and looked 
in each direction before beginning her L. hand 
turn and seeing no car either direction, she was 
not guilty of negligence and therefore did not 
contribute to the collision. But the excessive speed 
at which E. H. was driving his car approaching 
an intersection of Church and Kentucky streets 
was the proximate and immediate cause of the 
collision. 
Gartman v. Taylor, 164 S. 660. 
Suppose the defendant had looked North again after 
he saw the Holbrook car at 600 feet south of his truck. 
He would then have seen the plaintiff's car some,vhere 
near 1000 feet from his truck slowing down, indicating 
she was going to await his forward movement after the 
passing of the Holbrook car, which at the time of de-
fendant's stopping was 150 to 200 feet from him and 
plaintiff was approximately 500 feet north from him. 
It might be said of her as Justice Pr.att said in 
Bullock vs. Luke, et al, 98 U. 501, 98 P. 2d 350, "Any 
pre.sumption that Luke was going to afford him the 
right-of-way was not in the picture." 
. Defendant maintains of himself as was said by 
Justice Wolfe in said Bullock vs. Luke, "Another illus-
tration would be where one enters the intersection defin-
itely with the right-of-way, and with due c.are in relation 
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to any other also exercising due care and assumes his 
right-of-way to his injury, he should be allowed to re-
cover." 
DEFENDANT'S POINT I. 
THE UTAH RULE IS THAT DEFENDANT HAD THE 
RIGHT OF VvAY; AND ACCORDINGLY PLAINTIFF IS 
NO·T ENTITLED TO RECOVER. 
Plaintiff's testimony and testimony of ,\~itnesses 
above named precludes plaintiff's recovery. Our statute, 
±1-61±6 U.C.A. 1953, in part provides: 
(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a 
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the conditions and having regard 
to the actual and potential hazards then existing. 
In every event speed shall be so controlled as 
may be necessary to avoid colliding with any * * * 
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the 
highway in compliance "\Yith legal requiren1ents 
and the duty of all persons to use due care. 
(c) The driver of every vehicle shall, consis-
tent with the requiren1ents of subdivision (.a) of 
this section, drive at an appropriate reduced speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection 
* * * and 'vhen special hazard exists "\vith respect 
to * * * other traffic * * *. 
Our Supre1ue Court held the driYer entering a thru 
higlnvay first had the right-of-,vay "~here he had stopped 
before the other ear had entered the intersection: 
"l\{otorist stopping before entering through 
street, as required by ordinanee, eon1plied 'vith 
all its require1nents, and "~as free to 1nove with-
out restrirtion, relying on C. L. '17 Sec. 3978, as 
a1nended by L. lT. 1923, c 47, providing that oper-
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ator of vehicle shall have right-of-way at inter-
section over one approaching from left." 
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 U. 362; 279 P. 893, Syl 3. 
"Instruction should have been given that, if 
plaintiff's failure to yield right of way to defend-
ant approaching fron1 right proximately contri-
buted to accident, he could not recover.'' 
Smith v. Lenzi, Supra, Syl 6. 
Said Utah case has been referred to in 81 A.L.R. 
192, and 164 A.L.R. 22-24. Summarizing A.L.R.'s vie\v 
of that case, we quote: 
"The view is taken by so1ne courts, however, 
if the motorist on the disfavored thoroughfare 
makes a proper stop at the stop sign, he is entitled 
to the right-of-way if he is on the right of the 
driver occupying the protected thoroughfare, or 
if he pre-empted the intersection before the latter 
reached it." 
It may be argued that the place of stop of the de-
fendant was not the proper place. It has been held 
"generally speaking, it is the duty of one approaching 
an arterial highway to stop at a point somewhere between 
the stop sign and the arterial highway where he may 
effectively observe traffic approaching on the arterial 
highway." 5 Am. Jur., Sec. 303, p. 669. This he did. 
In the instant case the defendant Inoved to disn1iss 
the complaint at the conclusions of the plaintiff's case. 
The court reserved the ruling and denied it when all of 
the evidence was in. We rilaintain now as then the evi-
dence of the plaintiff was insufficient to show the negli-
gence, if any, of the defendant was the proximate cause 
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of the plaintiff's damages. It affirmatively sho,ved her 
own negligence was the proximate cause of her dan1ages, 
and the damages of the defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S POINT II. 
COSTS SI-IOULD HAVE BEEl\f A \\7"ARDED TO 
THE DEFENDANT. 
Under U.R.C.P. 5-± (d) (1) costs shall be awarded 
to the prevailing party as of course unless the court 
otherwise directs. Interpreting this rule Justice Henroid 
in his dissenting opinion in H1tll vs. Good1nan, 4 U. 2d 
163, 290 P. 2d 245 stated that former practice would 
be followed in so far as applicable. In Checketts t·s. 
Collins, 78 U. 93; 1 P. 2d 950 our cou1i held that the 
co.sts went to the defendant as of course \Yhere neither 
plaintiff or defendant prevailed. If such is still the rule, 
defendant is entitled to his costs. 
Defendant believed the evidence herein entitled hun 
to recov;er_ against plaintiff. But in Yie\Y of the burden 
of the appellant in a la"r case~ believed, and no\Y believes~ 
neither party hereto can change the findings and judg-
ment of the lov;-er eourt. l-Ienee no assign1nent on the 
ma1n case. 
The rule on appeal is that the findings of the lo"\Yer 
court arP to be upheld "\Yhen thert' is con1petent creditable 
evidence to support san1e; and the eYidence is to be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
viewed favorably to the respondent. There is abundant 
substantial creditable evidence that the plaintiff was 
traveling in excess of 60 miles per hour at the time her 
tires began to skid 41 to 45 feet before her car struck 
the defendant's truck; and we subn1it it is a preponder-
ance of the evidence that sustains that view. 
The speed the plaintiff was traveling under the 
existing conditions, with the defendant ahnost directly 
in front of her; her failure to slow down, to keep her 
car under control, to sound her horn of her intention to 
try to pass ahead of the defendant, and her failure to 
see that defendant was interested in another approaching 
car, were each and all acts of negligence which v1ere 
the proximate cause of her damages, and contributed 
to the same. 
Accordingly -vve submit that the findings of fact, 
conclusions of la,v, and judgment of the trial court dis-
missing the plaintiff's complaint should be sustained; 
and the defendant should have his costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UJeff Je Jent~en 
Of Jensen & Jensen, Lawyers 
P. 0. Address: Nephi, Utah 
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